MAIB final report finds Bayesian's stability booklet missed the risk that sank her
With sails furled and keel raised, the superyacht could be knocked down by beam gusts above 63 knots, a risk her crew were never told about

The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch has published its final report on the sailing yacht Bayesian, which capsized and sank at anchor off Porticello, Sicily, on 19 August 2024 with the loss of seven lives. It concludes that "with no sails set, Bayesian was vulnerable to knockdown in severe winds", and that the risk was absent from the documents her crew relied on.
Bayesian had anchored to wait out bad weather, with her centreboard raised and all sails furled, a condition that complied with her stability booklet. The wind rose from about 0300, reached 30 knots by 0355, and at 0406 the yacht heeled suddenly to starboard and sank. Six passengers and the chef died; 15 people were rescued.
What did the investigators find?
The MAIB commissioned the Wolfson Unit for Marine Technology at the University of Southampton to model the capsize. Bayesian carried a single aluminium mast standing about 235 feet above the water. With the wind directly on the beam and the yacht in its bare-mast, keel-up condition, the study found that gusts above 63 knots would likely knock her down and capsize her.
The risks of operating bare-masted and keel-up in high winds "were not identified in the stability information book carried on board", the MAIB found, so the crew had no reason to expect a knockdown at anchor and did not close external doors, flush hatches and other openings as the gusts built. The MAIB found it unlikely that downflooding had a material effect until the yacht was already on her side and unable to right herself.
Unlike Italian prosecutors and the yacht's builders, the MAIB does not identify crew error as a critical factor. It points instead to the design, the stability analysis and the documentation.
What changes does the MAIB want?
The class rules under which Bayesian was designed and built did not require monohull sailing yachts to be assessed for resistance to high winds while motoring or at anchor with sails down. The MAIB has asked the Red Ensign Group to revise its sailing yacht code to close that gap, to add high-wind warnings to stability booklets, and to tighten liferaft stowage rules so that rafts float free in a knockdown.
Bayesian's liferafts did not release on their own. The master and a deckhand swam back to the sinking yacht and freed the port forward raft, which gave the survivors flotation and carried the flares used to raise the alarm. Inside, a deckhand opened an exterior door from outside to let three people out of the flooding wheelhouse, and one officer dived repeatedly to open sliding doors from a water-filled compartment.
The full report is on the MAIB's Bayesian report page.
This story is part of the Maritime Briefing of 20 November 2026.


