MAIB: Arvia lift moved on a stored call while a technician was in the shaft
The investigation into the October 2025 death on the P&O Cruises ship found no shared plan and self-resetting door interlocks used as the barrier
An electrical technician on the cruise ship Arvia was crushed in a lift shaft because the lift had been returned to normal operation and moved in response to a stored call signal while he was inside, the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch has found. Its report, published on 8 October as report 20/2026, says the inspection was not supported by "a clearly communicated and mutually understood plan".
The technician, Lixter Dave Visaya Mahinay, a 35-year-old Filipino national, died at about 05:52 on 26 October 2025, when the ship was 75 nautical miles northwest of Cape Finisterre on passage from Southampton to Santa Cruz de Tenerife. He had joined Arvia on 14 September 2025 and had been promoted to electrical technician a week before the accident. Arvia, a 185,581 gt ship built by Meyer Werft in 2022 and registered in Bermuda, had 5,299 passengers and 1,681 crew on board. The MAIB investigated on behalf of the Bermuda registry.
How did the accident happen?
Passenger lift 14 had stopped working after a voyage in which the ship met force 12 conditions. Over two night shifts the transport team repaired a damaged travelling cable, replaced a blown fuse and adjusted a cable bracket, each time reaching the lift car top from deck 14 because the release key would not open the landing doors on deck 12. After testing, the lift was put back into normal mode. The senior electro-technical officer then ran a further test with the technician and decided to inspect the bracket, holding the lift doors open at deck 11 while the technician went upstairs.
The technician again failed to open the deck 12 doors, went to deck 14, opened the landing doors and entered the shaft. The counterweighted landing doors closed behind him. When the officer stepped away from the deck 11 doors, they also closed, the lift safety circuit was restored, and the lift moved up in answer to a stored call. The technician was pronounced dead at 06:07, and the ship diverted to A Coruña.
What did the investigation find?
The MAIB found that positive control of the lift had not been established before the technician entered the shaft, and that the system of work relied on door interlocks which reset themselves when the doors closed. The permit to work did not recognise that the task had gone beyond its authorised scope, and training and competence checks for lift work were inconsistent: the officer leading the night team had done no lift safety training with the company. The report compares the accident with the 2007 deaths of crew members on the tanker British Mallard and on MSC Colombia.
Carnival UK has told its senior electro-technical officers to reinforce lift maintenance rules, including a ban on using the shaft ladder to reach the car top, added manufacturer-specific safety information to its training material and required everyone doing lift maintenance to have completed basic safety training within the last six months. The MAIB report recommends that Carnival UK review the use of self-resetting lift door interlocks as a safety barrier during maintenance and inspection.
This story is part of the Maritime Briefing of 12 October 2026.
